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THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE BENEFITS t
Jonathan Barry Forman*
The United States operates a multibillion dollar social
welfare system of enormous size and complexity.1 Millions of
Americans receive benefits under such social welfare programs
as Social Security, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), and food stamps. The federal government alone will
spend approximately $650 billion on social welfare programs
in fiscal year 1994.2
Internal Revenue Service rulings historically have exempted
social welfare benefits from income taxation.3 In the past
fifteen years, however, Congress has expressly subjected
unemployment compensation and a portion of Social Security
benefits to income taxation.4 This Article considers whether
income taxation should be extended to other social welfare
benefits. In particular, this Article discusses the appropriate-
ness of taxing AFDC, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, housing assistance, and
workers' compensation.
Part I of this Article describes the major social welfare
programs in the United States. Part II outlines the basic
structure of the federal income tax and describes how social
t © 1994 Jonathan Barry Forman. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. B.A. 1973, Northwestern
University; M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of
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thank my research assistant Inga Ladd.
1. For a detailed analysis of the complexity of the social welfare system, see
Jonathan B. Forman, Administrative Savings from Synchronizing Social Welfare
Programs and Tax Provisions, 13 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Forman, Administrative Savings] (long version); Jonathan B. Forman, Synchro-
nizing Social Welfare Programs and Tax Provisions, 59 TAX NOTES 417 (1993) (short
version).
2. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS-1993 GREEN BOOK 1767 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter 1993
GREEN BOOK]. Note that more than $485 billion in expenditures is attributable solely
to Social Security and Medicare payments. Id.
3. E.g., I.T. 3447, 1941-1 C.B. 191 (holding that Social Security benefits "are not
subject to Federal income tax"), superseded by Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1 C.B. 13
(holding that Social Security benefits "are not includible in gross income" and
therefore are not taxed).
4. See infra Part II.B.1, 3.
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welfare benefits are treated by the income tax system.
Finally, Part III surveys some recent proposals to tax
particular social welfare benefits and considers the arguments
for and against taxing such benefits. The Article concludes
that the need for new revenue sources will push the federal
government to reconsider the tax treatment of social welfare
benefits.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM
Dozens of social welfare programs provide assistance to
individuals for retirement, disability, health, education, hous-
ing, public assistance, employment, and other needs.' The
vast majority of these social welfare programs transfer cash or
in-kind benefits, such as food or medical care, directly to
individuals.6
Social welfare policy analysts generally differentiate
between transfer programs that are "means-tested" and those
that are not. Eligibility and benefits for means-tested
programs like AFDC, SSI, Medicaid, food stamps, housing
assistance, and energy assistance depend upon an individual's
need, as measured by the individual's income and assets.
Eligibility for non-means-tested programs, like Social Security
and Medicare, is based on other criteria such as age and work
history.
A. Means-Tested Programs
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Aid to
Families with Dependent Children7 (AFDC) provides cash
5. Indeed, some 75 federal programs provide such assistance to low-income
individuals. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICY, COORDINATING FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
BACKGROUND MATERIALS ix, 3 (1991); see also Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP,
DOMESTIC POLY COUNCIL, UP FROM DEPENDENCY: A NEW NATIONAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
STRATEGY 9-15 (1986) (listing 99 low-income assistance programs).
6. Social welfare assistance which is not transferred directly to individuals
(such as education grants to schools) and transfers to individuals which are not
directly related to social welfare (such as farm subsidies) are beyond the scope of this
Article. Similarly, programs providing social welfare assistance to individuals
indirectly, such as the exclusion of life insurance proceeds from gross income, I.R.C.
§ 101(a)(1) (1988), are generally beyond the scope of this Article, as are the various
loan and loan guarantee programs, such as the student loan program.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988).
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assistance and other services to needy families with dependent
children to allow them to become self-sufficient.8 AFDC
provides cash welfare payments through the states for: (1)
needy children who have been deprived of parental support or
care due to a parent's incapacitation, death, unemployment or
continuous absence from the home; and (2) certain others in
the household of a child covered by the program.9
Individual states define the term need, determine benefit
levels, establish income and resource eligibility limits within
federal guidelines, and administer or supervise the adminis-
tration of the program in their state. The federal government
pays fifty to eighty percent of AFDC costs. AFDC payments
vary dramatically from state to state because each state sets
different benefit levels. For example, in January 1993, the
maximum monthly grant that an AFDC family of three could
receive ranged from $120 in Mississippi to $923 in Alaska. °
In fiscal year 1992, the AFDC program had a nationwide,
average monthly caseload of almost 4.8 million households, or
13.6 million persons." The program provided $22.2 billion in
total benefits in fiscal year 1992 and cost a total of $2.7 billion
to administer. 12 In fiscal year 1992, monthly AFDC benefits
averaged $136 per person and $388 per family. 13
2. Supplemental Security Income-Supplemental Security
Income (SSI)14 is a federal program that provides cash benefits
to needy persons who satisfy the program's criteria for age,
blindness, or disability.'5 In 1993, the regular federal benefit
was $434 per month for an individual, and $652 per month for
a couple.' 6 In 1992, 5.6 million people received over $22.2
8. See id. § 601; see also 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 615 (describing the
AFDC program and its eligibility requirements).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)-(b) (1988). In addition, many states also provide short-
term emergency assistance or general assistance to persons not covered by AFDC.
Although the tax treatment of these cash transfer programs follows that of AFDC,
the details of these programs are beyond the scope of this Article.
10. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 655, 657-58.
11. ' Id. at 682.
12. Id. at 679.
13. Id. at 682.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (1988).
15. See id. § 1382 (listing SSI eligibility requirements); see also 1993 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 2, at 813-17 (describing SSI payments and eligibility requirements).
16. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 823. Some states, however, provide small
additional supplements. Id. at 823, 829-30.
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billion in SSI benefits. 17 In September of 1992, the average
monthly benefit paid to an SSI recipient was about $350.18
3. Medicaid-Medicaid1 9 is a federal-state matching
entitlement program which provides medical assistance for
needy persons who are aged, blind, disabled, recipients of SSI
and AFDC, and pregnant women and children with family
incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty income
guidelines.2 ° States design and administer their programs
within federal guidelines, and the federal government reim-
burses them for fifty to eighty-three percent of their costs.
21
In fiscal year 1991, the Medicaid program served 28.3 million
people at a total cost of $77 billion.22 The average annual
expenditure per person was $2725.23
4. Food Assistance-Several social welfare programs
provide food assistance to needy households. The largest of
these, the Food Stamp Program,24 is administered by state
agencies operating under the supervision of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture.2 ' The federal government fully finances
food stamp benefits and reimburses one-half of a state's
administrative expenses.26 In general, food stamp benefits are
issued in coupon booklets which are used by participating
households to buy food items for home preparation and
consumption. The amount of benefits is related to the
household's size, its adjusted monthly income, and a maximum
monthly benefit level.27 In fiscal year 1992, the Food Stamp
Program served 26.9 million people 28 at a total cost of $24.9
billion.29 Monthly food stamp benefits averaged $68.50 per
person, or about $170 per household.30
17. Id. at 815.
18. Id. at 841.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1397e (1988).
20. See id. § 1396c (listing Medicaid eligibility requirements); see also 1993
GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1633-38 (describing Medicaid program eligibility
requirements).
21. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1640.
22. Id. at 1648, 1656.
23. Id. at 1656.
24. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 (1988).
25. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1605-08.
26. See id. at 1607-08.
27. See id. at 1616-19.
28. Id. at 1609.
29. Id. at 1626.
30. Id. at 1617.
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The Special Supplemental Food Program for Women,
Infants, and Children31 (WIC) provides food supplements and
nutritional education and screening to needy pregnant,
breastfeeding, and postpartum women and their infants, as
well as to needy children up to age five.32 This program is
federally funded, but it is administered by the states. WIC
has categorical income and nutritional risk requirements for
eligibility.33 In fiscal year 1992, the federal government spent
$2.6 billion to assist 5.4 million women, infants, and chil-
dren.34 In fiscal year 1991, the average monthly cost of a WIC
food package was $31.67 per participant.35
The National School Lunch Program36 (NSLP) and the
School Breakfast Program37 provide free and reduced-price
meals to needy children at participating elementary and
secondary schools.3" For fiscal year 1992, the federal govern-
ment spent $5.25 billion on these two programs, 39 with the
NSLP alone delivering almost 4.1 billion lunches to an average
of 24.5 million students a day.
40
5. Housing Assistance-A number of programs administered
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
and the U.S. Farmers Home Administration provide housing
assistance for low-income households. 4' Most housing assistance
is provided in the form of traditional rental or homeowners'
assistance. Rental assistance is provided through two basic
approaches: (1) project-based aid, like the public housing
program42 and the Section 8 new construction and substantial
rehabilitation program;43 and (2) household-based subsidies, like
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1988).
32. See id. § 1786(a) (declaring the purpose of WIC); see also 1993 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 2, at 1681-83 (describing WIC and its eligibility requirements).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1786(d) (1988) (stating WIC's nutrition and income eligibility
requirements).
34. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1683.
35. Id. at 1681.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769b (1988).
37. Id. § 1773.
38. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1677 (noting that in 1992 over 90,000
schools participated in the NSLP and that over 50,000 schools participated in the
School Breakfast Program).
39. Id. at 1678-79.
40. Id. at 1677.
41. See id. at 1667-76. See generally Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home For
Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (1993) (discussing
housing assistance programs).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1440 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(1988 & Supp. II 1990); see Salsich, supra note 41, at 1623-24
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Section 8 rental certificates and vouchers. 4' Homeowners'
assistance is provided in the form of mortgage-interest
subsidies.45 Federal housing assistance never has been provided
as an entitlement to all eligible low-income households.46 In
fiscal year 1993, the federal government spent almost $20
billion 47  to provide housing assistance to 5.7 million
households.48 The average subsidy per participating household
was $4240.49
6. Energy Assistance-The Low-Income Home Energy
Assistance Program 50 (LIHEAP) helps low-income families meet
their home energy expenses.5' In fiscal year 1992, the federal
government allotted almost $1.5 billion5 2 to the states for
distribution to eligible low-income households to pay their
heating or cooling bills, for low-cost weatherization, and to assist
households during energy-related emergencies.53 Over 5.8
million households received heating assistance benefits.5 4
B. Non-Means-Tested Programs
1. Social Security-The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance55
program (OASI) provides a pension to retired workers and their
dependents and survivors in the form of monthly cash benefits.56
The Disability Insurance57 program (DI) provides similar
payments to disabled workers under age sixty-five and their
dependents.58 These programs protect workers who hold
employment that is covered by the Social Security system. The
(discussing the Section 8 program).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (Supp. II 1992).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(5) (1988).
46. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1667.
47. Id. at 1673.
48. Id. at 1675.
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621-8629 (1988).
51. See id. § 8621(a); see also 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1692-98
(discussing LIHEAP's goals).
52. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1692.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1697.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988).
56. See id. § 402 (listing OASI eligibility requirements); see also 1993 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 2, at 3-8 (discussing OASI eligibility requirements).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1988).
58. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 51.
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employee contribution is withheld from wage and salary
payments and is matched by employers. Roughly ninety-six
percent of the current paid work force is engaged in covered
employment. 59
After retirement, disability, or death, monthly Social Security
benefits are paid to insured workers and their eligible
dependents or survivors. Although benefit calculations are
complex, they generally are related to the earning history of
the insured worker.6 ° The programs are quite large and costly.
For example, in December 1992, there were 41.5 million
beneficiaries in the OASI and DI programs,6 1 and in fiscal year
1993, the total cost of the programs was estimated to be almost
$305 billion.62 The average payment to a retired worker was
$653 per month, 3 and the average payment to a disabled worker
was $626 per month.64 Additional amounts were paid to
dependents of these covered workers.
65
2. Medicare-Medicare66 is a federal health care program
for the aged and for certain disabled persons. 67 It consists of
two parts: the hospital insurance program (part A) and the
supplementary medical insurance program (part B). Persons
aged sixty-five and older are entitled to protection under part
A if they are "fully insured" under Social Security. Participation
in Part B is voluntary and requires the payment of a monthly
premium of $36.60 as of January 1, 1993.68 People under age
sixty-five who receive monthly Social Security disability benefits
are also eligible for Medicare after a two-year waiting period.69
In fiscal year 1993, 31.3 million aged persons and 3.7 million
disabled persons were estimated to be covered by Medicare part
A, and 30.8 million aged persons and 3.4 million disabled
persons elected coverage under part B.70 The total program
59. See id. at 3.
60. See id. at 4.
61. Id. at 123.
62. Id. at 86.
63. Id. at 42.
64. Id. at 52.
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1988) (describing Medicare); see also 1993 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 2, at 137 (same).
68. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 137.
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1988) (describing the eligibility requirements of Social
Security recipients under age 65).
70. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 137.
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costs are projected to reach $167.3 billion in fiscal year 1994.71
The average annual benefit per person enrolled under Part A
is projected to be $2842 in fiscal year 1994, and the average
annual benefit per person enrolled under Part B is projected
to be $1802.72
3. Unemployment Compensation-Unemployment Com-
pensation7 3 is a joint program of the federal government and
the states which provides cash benefits to recently unemployed
individuals.74 States administer their programs within federal
guidelines. Ninety-nine percent of all wage and salary workers
and ninety percent of all employed persons are covered by
unemployment compensation, totalling about 105 million
individuals in all.75
Benefits are financed by funds raised under the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act 76 (FUTA) taxes, a gross tax of 6.2% on
the first $7000 paid annually by covered employers to each
employee.77 States set the benefit amounts as a fraction of the
individual's weekly wage up to some state-determined maxi-
mum. Unemployed persons usually receive unemployment
benefits for twenty-six weeks; however, the federal-state
extended benefits program7 provides for up to an additional
thirteen weeks of coverage. In fiscal year 1992, national weekly
benefits averaged $173 with benefits being paid for an average
of 15.9 weeks, resulting in average total benefits of $275 1.79
4. Workers' Compensation-Workers' compensation pro-
grams provide monetary and medical benefits to workers
disabled on the job and to survivors of workers who are killed
by work-related accidents or illness.80 While most workers'
compensation programs are managed and financed by individual
states, the federal government provides similar benefits through
a number of programs.8" Approximately 95.1 million workers
71. Id. at 192.
72. Id. at 138-39.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1109, 1321-1324 (1988).
74. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 474 (discussing the Unemployment
Compensation Program).
75. See id. at 490.
76. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV 1992).
78. 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
79. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 501.
80. See id. at 1702.
81. See William J. Nelson, Jr., Workers' Compensation: 1984-88 Benchmark
Revisions, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Fall 1992, at 41 (stating that all 50 states maintain
workers' compensation programs and that the federal government maintains similar
792
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representing 87% of the workforce, were covered by workers'
compensation laws during an average month in 1990.82
Workers' compensation benefits vary dramatically from state
to state. For example, in July of 1988, the maximum weekly
benefit level ranged from $175 in Georgia to $1094 in Alaska,
with a median amount of $340.50.83 In 1990, total workers'
compensation benefit payments exceeded $38 billion.84
II. THE FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx TREATMENT
OF SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS
A. An Overview of the Federal Income Tax
The federal income tax is imposed on a taxpayer's taxable
income."5 A taxpayer first determines the amount of her gross
income. The term "gross income" means all income from
whatever source derived, including, but not limited to, wages,
salary, tips, dividends, interest, rents, and royalties received
by the taxpayer during the taxable year.86 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the term broadly to include all "undeniable
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion."87 At the same time,
however, there are numerous statutory exclusions from gross
income."s For example, most gifts and inheritances received
by a taxpayer are excluded expressly from gross income. 9
To determine her taxable income, a taxpayer subtracts allowed
deductions from gross income.9" Certain deductions are allowed
without regard to whether the taxpayer chooses to itemize. 91
After taking these deductions, most taxpayers simply claim a
programs for the District of Columbia and for federal workers).
82. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1703-05.
83. See id. at 1703.
84. Id. at 1705.
85. I.R.C. §§ 1, 63 (1988).
86. Id. § 61.
87. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
88. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 101-135 (1988).
89. Id. § 102(a).
90. Id. § 63(a).
91. See, e.g., id. § 62 (allowing deductions for certain business expenses and
reimbursed expenses of employees).
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standard deduction 92 and personal exemptions.93  Many
taxpayers, however, claim certain itemized deductions in lieu
of the standard deduction.94
A taxpayer's tentative tax liability is then determined by
applying various marginal tax rates to taxable income.95 The
amount that the taxpayer must pay or, alternatively, will
receive as a refund, 96 is the taxpayer's tentative tax liability
minus allowable credits.97
Of the $1.2 trillion that the federal government expects to
raise in fiscal year 1994, $500.8 billion is expected to come from
the individual income tax.98
B. The Income Tax Treatment of Social Welfare Benefits
By long-standing IRS policy, public assistance payments are
excluded from gross income. 99 According to the pertinent IRS
publication, a taxpayer should not include as taxable income
"benefit payments from a public welfare fund, such as payments
due to blindness."100 Thus, the value ofAFDC, SSI, food stamps,
92. Id. § 63(b)(1), (c) (granting a standard deduction of $5000 for a joint return
and $3000 for an unmarried individual).
93. Id. §§ 63(b)(2), 151 (allowing a $2000 exemption per dependent).
94. Id. §§ 63(d), 161-219. (providing that itemized deductions include medical
expenses, charitable gifts, retirement savings, and certain moving expenses).
95. I.R.C. § 1 (1988). In addition, a 10% surtax is imposed on high-income
taxpayers. Id.
96. I.R.C. §§ 6401(b), 6402 (1988) (detailing provisions for determining the amount
of overpayments and allowing for refunds or credits).
97. I.R.C. §§ 21-35 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (listing credits allowable to individuals).
98. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1760.
99. E.g., Rev. Rul. 78-170, 1978-1 C.B. 24 (excluding from gross income payments
to reduce energy costs for low-income, elderly, or disabled heads of households); Rev.
Rul. 76-395, 1976-2 C.B. 16 (excluding from gross income grants to low-income
recipients under the Housing and Community DevelopmentAct, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317
(1988), which are given primarily for the correction of critical code violations); Rev.
Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (excluding from gross income grants under the Disaster
Relief Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5202 (1988), to persons who as a result of a major disaster
are unable to meet necessary expenses and needs); Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1 C.B. 13,
superseding I.T. 3447, 1941-1 C.B. 191 (excluding from gross income grants under § 202
of Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1988), which are given as
insurance benefit payments); see also 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1062 (noting
that many types of welfare payments are excludable from gross income pursuant to
revenue rulings).
100. I.R.S., PUB. No. 525, TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME 24 (1992).
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Medicaid, and housing assistance benefits are not subject to
income taxation. 101
1. Social Security-Originally, the Internal Revenue Code
did not address the tax treatment of Social Security benefits,
however, a series of IRS rulings have exempted Social Security
benefits from income taxation.0 2 Over the years, many tax
analysts have suggested taxing Social Security benefits more
like other forms of retirement benefits or income that is
designed to replace wages.1
0 3
Partial taxation of Social Security benfits was adopted in the
Social Security Amendments of 1983.104 The Amendments added
a new § 86 to the Internal Revenue Code which required single
taxpayers with incomes over $25,000 and married couples with
incomes over $32,000 to pay income taxes on as much as half
of their Social Security benefits. 05 Basically, the sum of a
taxpayer's adjusted gross income, tax-free interest income, and
one-half of Social Security retirement benefits was compared
to a base amount of $25,000 for a single taxpayer, or $32,000
for a married couple filing a joint tax return.' 6 If the sum
exceeded the base amount, the amount of Social Security
retirement benefits to be included in taxable income was the
101. The applicable IRS publication also expressly excludes payments from a state
fund for victims of crime that are in the nature of welfare payments; payments from
a state welfare agency for taking part in a work-training program which do not exceed
the public welfare benefits they replace; grants under the Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5121-5202 (1988); mortgage assistance payments; payments made by a state to
reduce the cost of winter energy use; and food benefits received. Id.
Social welfare benefits also are not subject to Social Security taxes. Such benefits
are not "wages" for Federal Insurance Contributions Act purposes, nor are they "self-
employment earnings" for Self-Employment Compensation Act purposes. See I.R.C.
§§ 3121, 1402 (1988) (defining the terms wages and self-employment earnings).
Whether any social welfare benefits should be subject to Social Security taxation
is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some social
welfare benefits, like workers' compensation and unemployment compensation, are
substitutes for wages and self-employment earnings that are subject to Social Security
taxation.
102. See, e.g., I.T. 3447, 1941-1 C.B. 191, superseded by Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1
C.B. 13; I.T. 3229, 1938-2 C.B. 136; I.T. 3194, 1938-1 C.B. 114.
103. See, e.g., RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVmuAL INcOME TAX 103-07 (1976) (suggesting
that a fraction of Social Security benefits be taxed); see infra Part III.A.1.
104. Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65.
105. § 121, 97 Stat. at 80-84 (codified at I.R.C. § 86 (1988)). See generally I.R.S.,
PUB. No. 915, SOcIAL SEcuRirY BENEFIrs AND EQUIVALEN RAIROAD RETmEME BENEFITs
(1992) (discussing the taxation of Social Security benefits under the amendments).
106. See I.R.C. § 86 (1988). This section also applies to tier one railroad retirement
benefits. Id. § 86(d).
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lesser of: (1) one-half of the excess of such amount over the base
amount, or (2) one-half of benefits received.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993107 added a
second tier of Social Security benefit inclusion to the formula
for determining the amount of benefits to be taxed. Beginning
in 1994, single taxpayers with incomes over $34,000 and
married couples with incomes over $44,000 will have to pay
income taxes on as much as eighty-five percent of their Social
Security benefits.'0 8  Eighty-five percent was set as the
maximum because no near-retirees would have paid employee
Social Security taxes totaling fifteen percent of the present value
of their benefits. 10 9
Neither the $25,000 and $32,000 floors nor the $34,000 and
$44,000 floors are indexed for inflation, and the Congressional
Budget Office has estimated that in 1994 more than 8.1 million
beneficiaries will be affected by the taxation of benefits; a figure
which may amount to twenty-two percent of all Social Security
beneficiaries. 110 Additionally, the lack of indexing, coupled with
inflation, will result in even more taxpayers paying taxes on
their Social Security benefits in future years."'
2. Medicare-Medicare benefits never have been expressly
excluded from gross income by statute."2 In 1970, however,
soon after the enactment of Medicare, the IRS ruled that
benefits under Medicare are not includable in gross income.113
The ruling applies to Medicare benefits received both under Part
A (hospital insurance) and Part B (supplementary medical
insurance). The IRS excludes Part A benefits from gross income
because they "are in the nature of disbursements made in
furtherance of the social welfare objectives of the Federal
government." 114 Part B payments are excluded from income
107. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,215, 107 Stat. 312, 475-77 (codified at I.R.C. § 86
(1988)).
108. Id.
109. See Robert J. Myers, Is the 85-Percent Factor for Taxing Social Security Benefits
Perpetually Correct?, 58 TAx NOTES 1545, 1545-46 (1993) (arguing that the 15% factor
may be on the low side and that 20% would result in "rough justice" until 1997).
110. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 32.
111. See Myers, supra note 109, at 1545 (noting that the lack of indexing means
that the income floors will "wither away," eventually resulting in 40% of beneficiaries
paying taxes on their benefits).
112. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1048-49.
113. See Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31.
114. Id.
796
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because they fall under a provision which exempts from gross
income amounts received through health insurance for personal
injuries or sickness." 5
3. Unemployment Compensation-Like other social welfare
benefits, unemployment benefits originally were not subject to
income taxation. u6 By the 1970s, however, many tax analysts
argued that the exclusion of unemployment benefits from
taxation was inequitable and also had an adverse impact on
the frequency and duration of unemployment.1 7 In a relatively
unusual triumph of policy analysis over politics,"' Congress
began taxing a portion of unemployment compensation benefits
in 1979.1'9 In 1984, the U.S. Department of Treasury
recommended repealing the partial exclusion that remained.'2
In 1985, President Reagan made that recommendation to
Congress, 121 and since 1987, unemployment compensation
115. Id.; see I.R.C. § 104(a) (1988).
116. See generally 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 499-500 (describing the tax
treatment of unemployment compensation).
117. See, e.g., U.S. DEP't OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 56 (1977)
[hereinafter BLUEPRINTS] (stating that tax free unemployment compensation creates
a disincentive to seeking employment during the benefit eligibility period); Emil M.
Sunley, Jr., Employee Benefits and Transfer Payments, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
TAXATION 100-01 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) (stating that it is inequitable to exempt
unemployment benefits from taxation where individuals have other sources ofincome,
such as a working spouse).
The exclusion of unemployment compensation benefits from gross income was
thought to be inequitable because it resulted in persons with equal spending power
owing differing amounts of income taxes. Worse still, the value of the exclusion of
unemployment compensation benefits increased with the worker's marginal tax rate
so that high-income workers received the largest benefit from the exclusion. See
BLUEPRINTS, supra, at 56.
The exclusion of unemployment compensation benefits from taxation also was
thought to create disincentives for work. In a seminal piece, economist Martin
Feldstein showed that, on the average, unemployment benefits replaced more than
60% of lost after-tax income. See Martin I. Feldstein, Unemployment Compensation:
Adverse Incentives and Distributional Anomalies, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 231, 242-43 (1974).
Feldstein found that such high replacement rates had an adverse impact on the
frequency and duration of unemployment. Id. at 232-33. Accordingly, he urged that
unemployment compensation benefits be taxed. Id. at 243.
118. Taxing unemployment benefits was considered bad politics because of the
persistent myths that such benefits return only a small percentage of lost income and
that only the poor collect such benefits. See Feldstein, supra note 117, at 231; Sunley,
supra note 117, at 105-06.
119. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 112(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2777 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 105 (1988)).
120. 2 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, US. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICrY, AND ECONOMIC GROwTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRFSIDENT
54 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 TREASURY REPORT].
121. THE WHI HOUSE, THE PRESiDENT' TAx PRoPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FmenF,
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benefits have been fully includable in income. 122 The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that in 1994 more
than 8.3 million taxpayers, eighty-seven percent of all
unemployment compensation beneficiaries, will be affected by
the taxation of unemployment compensation benefits. 123
4. Workers' Compensation-The Internal Revenue Code
expressly exempts workers' compensation benefits from
taxation. 124 This exclusion has been included in the tax law
since 1918, and it appears that workers' compensation payments
were not subject to tax prior to that time. 125
In general, gross income does not include amounts received
under a workers' compensation act or under a statute in the
nature of a workers' compensation act which provides for
compensation to employees for personal injuries or sickness
incurred in the course of employment. 26 The exclusion also
applies to workers' compensation payments made to survivors
of deceased employees. 12
7
On the other hand, the exclusion does not apply to a
retirement pension or annuity that is determined on the basis
of the employee's age, length of service, or contribution to the
plan, even if the employee's retirement is the result of a work
injury or sickness. 2 ' Nor does the exclusion apply to amounts
received as compensation for a nonoccupational injury or
sickness, or as compensation for a work injury to the extent that
they exceed amounts available under applicable workers'
compensation acts.1
29
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 49-56 (1985) [hereinafter REAGAN TAX PROPOSAL].
122. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 121, 100 Stat. 2085, 2109
(codified at I.R.C. § 85 (1988)).
123. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 500.
124. I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (1988).
125. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1073.
126. I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(b) (1970). For example, amounts
received under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1988), generally are excluded from gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(b)
(1970). Similarly, payments made to coal miners or their survivors for death or
disability resulting from black lung disease are excluded from gross income. Rev. Rul.
72-400, 1972-2 C.B. 75-76; 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1074.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(b) (1970).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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III. RECENT PROPOSALS TO TAX SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS
A. Forces Pushing the Federal Government
to Tax Social Welfare Benefits
In recent years, two forces have pushed the federal govern-
ment towards further taxation of social welfare benefits. First,
most tax reformers favor a broad definition of income that would
logically include social welfare benefits in the income tax base.
Second, the need for revenues to offset the federal government's
perpetual budget deficits has made the ever-growing social
welfare system an inviting target for taxation.
1. Defining the Income Tax Base to Include Social Welfare
Benefits-Over the years, many proposals for income tax reform
have focused on conforming the income tax base to some compre-
hensive definition of economic income. ° The basic notion
130. The classic economic definition of income, also known as the Haig-Simons
definition of income, is as follows:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of(1) the market value
of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the
period to "wealth" at the end of the period and then substracting "wealth" at the
beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain, as our courts have recognized
in their more lucid moments-and gain to someone during a specified time
interval. Moreover, this gain may be measured and defined most easily by
positing a dual objective or purpose, consumption and accumulation, each of which
may be estimated in a common unit by appeal to market prices.
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM
OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); accord STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D
SESS., ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO BROADENING THE BASE AND LOWERING THE RATES
OF THE INCOME TAX 3-4 (Comm. Print 1982) ("income is defined as the ability to provide
oneself with goods and services, other than those goods and services which are
necessary to earn the income. Thus, for this purpose, income is generally measured
by substracting from the sum of the gross receipts and appreciation in asset value of
a taxpayer the amounts spent on goods or services which are costs of generating those
gross receipts and that appreciation."); Robert M. Haig, The Concept of
Income-Economic and LegalAspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (Robert M. Haig
ed., 1921); cf BLUEPRINTS, supra note 117, at 3 ("income may be viewed as the sum of
consumption and change in net worth in a given time period. Rather, the measurement
of income is accomplished by using the accounting notion that the sum of receipts from
all sources within a given time period must equal the sum of all uses."). See generally
WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980)
(reporting on a conference studying a proposal to tax expenditures); Henry Aaron, What
Is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 543 (1969) (advancing the
discussion of the use of the Haigs-Simons definition of income in a comprehensive tax
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behind comprehensive income taxation is that all income,
regardless of its source, should be included in the tax base and
taxed alike.' 3 ' Proponents of comprehensive income taxation
generally believe that the exclusion from income of social
welfare benefits represents a deviation from a "pure" income
tax which would reach all economic income.
Accordingly, at least some proponents of comprehensive
income taxation have called for income taxation of virtually all
social welfare transfer payments. 13 2  After all, many social
welfare beneficiaries are better off than their neighbors who
have the same income but who cannot exclude any portion of
their incomes from tax.
33
On the other hand, some proponents of comprehensive income
taxation would stop short of taxing means-tested benefits.
134
These reformers generally argue that equity concerns are
satisfied because means-tested benefits by their very nature
already are targeted to the most needy, and that taxing in-kind
benefits would present too many valuation and administrative
difficulties.
Nevertheless, as an outgrowth of the movement for compre-
hensive income taxation, the Congressional Budget and
system); Richard Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
TAXATION 1 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) (reporting on a conference regarding a
comprehensive income tax jointly sponsored by the Brookings Institute and the Fund
for Public Policy Research). But see Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as
a Goal of Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 932-34 (1967) (discussing the limits of
the Haig-Simons definition in implementing a comprehensive tax system).
131. Proponents of comprehensive income taxation generally point to the inequities
that result when some "income" is excluded from tax. See, e.g., John F. Due, Personal
Deductions, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX 37 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) ("any
deduction discriminates in favor ofpersons making greater than average expenditures
on deductible items"). The concern is that taxpayers with equal abilities to pay taxes
ultimately will pay widely different amounts of taxes.
132. For a number of these proposals see Paul M. Dodyk, The Tax Reform Act of
1969 and the Poor, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 758,794-800 (1971); Joseph A. Pechman, Erosion
of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 12-15 (1957); Joseph A. Pechman,
What Would a Comprehensive Individual Income Tax Yield?, in 1 TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM, PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 251,
260-61 (1959) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]; Melvin I. White, Consistent Treatment of
Items Excluded and Omitted from the Individual Income Tax Base, in COMPENDIUM,
supra, at 317, 319-20, 321, 326.
133. Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, supra note 132, at 13.
134. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 103, at 103 (arguing that there is a persuasive
case for excluding means-tested government transfer payments from taxable income);
David I. Kempler, Transitional Rules as a Tool for Effective Tax Reform, 36 BAYLOR
L. REV. 765, 779-81 (1984) (arguing that Social Security benefits should not be taxable);
Sunley, supra note 117, at 103-04 (stating that benefits under programs with stringent
means tests should not be taxable to beneficiaries).
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Impoundment Control Act of 1974135 (the Act) requires the
federal government to report, through tax expenditure budgets,
the revenue lost as a result of deviations from a "pure" income
tax.13' The Act defines tax expenditures as "those revenue losses
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow
a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income
or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or
a deferral of tax liability."37 Thus, the definition of a tax
expenditure draws a distinction between the ideal provisions
of an income tax and the special or preferential provisions that
are exceptions to that ideal structure.
38
The Act, however, does not specify the ideal structure of a tax
law. Consequently, deciding which provisions are special or
preferential is necessarily a matter of judgment. Scholars are
engaged in an ongoing debate over whether it is useful or proper
to flag certain expenditures in this way. 39 Nevertheless, the
135. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
136. See § 202(0(1), 88 Stat. at 304 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 602(f) (1988)).
For a historical analysis, see Jonathan B. Forman, The Origins of the Tax Expenditure
Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537 (1986).
137. 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1988).
138. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation,
the normal structure of the individual income tax includes the following major
components: one personal exemption for each taxpayer and one for each
dependent, the standard deduction, the existing tax rate schedule, and deductions
for investment and employee business expenses. Most other tax provisions can
be viewed as exceptions to the normal law.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FIScAL YEARS 1994-1998, at 4 (Comm. Print 1993) (footnotes omitted).
139. The debate first gained notice with a clash pitting Boris Bittker against Stanley
Surrey and William Hellmuth. Compare Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax
Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969) (opposing the tax
expenditure concept) and Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to
Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 538 (1969) (same) with Stanley S.
Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor
Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969) (discussing the advantages of the concept).
Echoes of the debate continue. See Jeffrey S. Lehman & Douglas A. Kahn, Tax
Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992). Compare Edward
A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status
Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1988) and Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and
Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 257
(1991) with Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to
Professor Zelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAX POLy' 225 (1991); and compare Edward Yorio, Equity,
Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987) and Edward
Yorio, The Future of Tax Reform: A Rejoinder to Professor Zelinsky, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 899 (1987) with Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Response
to Professor Yorio and His Vision of the Future of the Internal Revenue Code, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1987).
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various exclusions of social welfare benefits routinely have been
identified as tax expenditures in the tax expenditure budgets
prepared annually by the Office of Management and Budget
14
and by the Joint Committee on Taxation 14' and in reports of the
House Ways and Mean Committee, 42 the Senate Budget
Committee, 43 and the CBO. 1'
Table 1 reproduces the House Ways and Means Committee's
estimates of the revenue losses attributable to the special
income tax deductions, exclusions, and credits related to all of
the federal government's social welfare policy objectives in fiscal
year 1994.145 Table 1 shows that the partial exclusion of Social
to Professor Yorio and His Vision of the Future of the Internal Revenue Code, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1987).
140. S, eg., EXECIMVE OFFICE OF THE PEFSIDENT & OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, pt. 2, at 27-28, 34-36
(1992) (identifying as tax expenditures the exclusions for Medicare, workers'
compensation, special benefits for disabled coal miners, public assistance, Social
Security, and railroad retirement benefits). Earlier versions also identified the
exclusion of unemployment compensation benefits as a tax expenditure. See, e.g.,
EXECumVE OFFIcE OF THE P E DENT & OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS
F, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 108, 112 (1975).
141. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., ESTIMATES
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1994-1998, at 1718 (Comm. Print 1993)
(identifying as tax expenditures the exclusions for Medicare, workers' compensation,
special benefits for disabled coal miners, public assistance, Social Security, and railroad
retirement benefits). Earlier versions also identified the exclusion of unemployment
compensation benefits as a tax expenditure. See, e.g., STAFFS OF U.S. TREASURY DEP'T
& JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG. 1ST SESS., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 8 (Comm. Print 1975).
142. See, e.g., 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1020-89 (identifying Medicare,
Social Security benefits, workers' compensation, and special benefits for coal miners
as tax expenditures); infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
143. See, eg., SENATE COMM. ON BUDGET AND CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 102D
CONG., 2D SESS., TAX EXPENDnTURS: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL
PROVISIONS 453-70 (Comm. Print 1992) (identifying as tax expenditures the exclusions
for Medicare, workers' compensation, and special benefits for disabled coal miners).
Earlier versions also identified the exclusion of Social Security, railroadretirement,
public assistance, and unemployment compensation benefits as tax expenditures. See,
e.g., SENATE COMM. ON BUDGET, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM
OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 103-14 (Comm. Print 1976).
144. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 103D CONG., IST SESS., REDUCING THE
DEFCy. SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS A REFORr To THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMnITES
ON THE BUDGET 357-82 (1993) (hereinafter 1993 CBO OPTIONS] (recommending the
taxation of a portion of Medicare, workers' compensation, and special benefits for
disabled coal miners, and increased taxation ofSocial Security and railroad retirement
benefits). Earlier versions also recommended taxing unemployment compensation
benefits. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE FEDERAL DEFICIT:
STRATEGIFS AND OPTIONS A REPORT To THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE BUDGET,
pt. III, at B-60 (1982).
145. No revenue-loss estimates are available for the basic standard deduction or
personal exemption deductions, because the federal government's revenue estimators
apparently consider these to be "normal" features of an income tax, not tax
expenditures. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 138, at 3 (stating
that these deductions are not viewed as expenditures because they approximate the
amount of income necessary to obtain minimum amounts of food, shelter, and clothing).
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Security benefits was estimated to cost the federal government
$28 billion, the exclusion of Medicare benefits was estimated
to cost $13.1 billion, the exclusion for public assistance cash
payments was estimated to cost $0.5 billion, and the exclusion
of workers' compensation was estimated to cost $4.2 billion.'46
2. The Need for Revenues and the Social Welfare Benefit
Explosion-One of the most important forces behind recent tax
legislation is the need for revenues. 4 v Even with the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,148 the national debt exceeds
$3 trillion, and annual federal deficits in the neighborhood of
$200 billion dollars are expected for years to come.' 49 This need
for revenue surely will be an impetus for reconsideration of the
tax treatment of social welfare benefits.
The amount of revenues that could be raised by taxing social
welfare benefits has increased dramatically in recent years.
There are two reasons for this increase in potential revenues.
First, the total amount of social welfare benefits transferred
to individuals has increased markedly since the IRS first ruled
that social welfare payments were excluded from gross income.
For example, thirty years ago, food stamps and Medicare did
not even exist, and there were far fewer Social Security
beneficiaries. In 1993, however, more than 25 million Ameri-
cans received food stamps, 150 more than 35 million Americans
were covered by Medicare,' 51 and more than 40 million
Americans received Social Security benefits.
15 2
Second, the value of personal exemptions has eroded
dramatically since World War II, to the point where many
relatively low-income workers now must pay income taxes.1
5 3
The personal exemption amount was $600 in 1948, the
146. The consolidated revenue loss attributable to all tax expenditures related to
retirement, health, poverty, employment, and disability was estimated to be $172.4
billion. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1020. Each tax expenditure item is
measured without regard to other items. Hence, the addition of tax expenditure items
may be misleading. See id. at 1020 n.4.
147. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Effects of the Budget Process on Tax Legislation, 10
AM. J. TAx POLY 141, 141, 144 (1992).
148. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
149. See, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN
UPDATE 26 (1993) (stating the CBO's estimates for the deficit until the year 2003).
150. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1626.
151. Id. at 137.
152. Id. at 123.
153. See Reclaiming the Tax Code for American Families: Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2, 4 (1991)
(statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder, Committee Chairperson) (noting the decline
of the personal exemption as a percentage of personal income).
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equivalent of about $7000 in 1993.' Yet, the actual personal
exemption was just $2350 in 1993.55 This erosion in the value
of the personal exemption heightens the inequities that exist
between individuals earning taxable wages and nonworking
individuals receiving nontaxable social welfare benefits.
Given these facts, the federal government should reconsider
its reasons for excluding social welfare payments from income
taxation. As Table 1 illustrates, the federal government could
raise a tremendous amount of revenue by taxing all social
welfare benefits. The federal budget deficits invariably will lead
the government to consider taxing those benefits. Moreover,
the federal government almost certainly will need new revenues
to pay for proposed reforms of the national health care system'56
and the welfare system. 157 Indeed, the Clinton administration
is currently considering taxing food stamps, welfare benefits,
and housing assistance. 158 For that matter, any serious effort
to reform the health and welfare systems will require reconsid-
eration of the tax treatment of health and welfare benefits.
B. Recent Developments
1. Taxation of Social Security Benefits-For years, govern-
ment listings of tax expenditures have identified the exclusion
154. Id. at 4. If the personal exemption were adjusted for inflation, it would exceed
$3000. Id. at 5.
155. Rev. Proc. 92-102, 1992-2 C.B. 579, 580.
156. See, e.g., White House, Health Care Update, 93 TAx NOTES TODAY 169-6, Aug.
13, 1993.
The federal government is heavily involved in providing health care assistance
through Medicare, Medicaid, veterans benefits, the exclusion for employer-provided
health insurance premiums, the deduction of health care costs, federal employee
benefits, and other mechanisms. Indeed, in 1991, the federal government accounted
for over 31% ($209.3 billion) of all personal health spending. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra
note 2, at 286. Additionally, health care costs are growing rapidly, both as a percentage
of the gross domestic product and as a percentage of the federal budget. Moreover,
some 35 million Americans, or 14.1% of the population, lack adequate health care
coverage. Id. at 295. These are just some of the factors pushing the federal government
towards developing a cost-effective and comprehensive health care plan.
157. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Katz, Clinton's Welfare Reform Plan to Be Out in Fall, Aides
Say, 51 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1813 (1993) (discussing the Clinton welfare reform
proposal); see also WELFARE REFORM SIMPLIFICATION AND COORDINATION ADVISORY COMM.,
TIME FOR A CHANGE: REMAKING THE NATION'S WELFARE SYSTEM (1993) (members appointed
by former President George Bush).
158. See Jason DeParle, Clinton Considers Taxing Aid to Poor to Pay for Reform,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al.
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of Social Security benefits as a major cause of lost revenue.'59
Moreover, many tax analysts have recommended taxing a
greater portion of Social Security benefits, so that they are taxed
similarly to private pension plans. 6 ° Consequently, in 1983,
Congress began to tax a portion of Social Security benefits, and
in 1993, it extended taxation to an even larger portion of Social
Security benefits.
61
Further increases in the taxation of Social Security benefits
are plausible. In its 1993 report outlining options for deficit
reduction, the CBO discussed two ways to increase the taxation
of Social Security benefits: (1) increase the fraction of benefits
included in income; and (2) eliminate or reduce the $25,000
income threshold for singles and the $32,000 income threshold
for couples.'62 Table 2 shows that eliminating the income
thresholds and taxing fifty percent of benefits would raise $43.6
billion over five years. Table 2 also shows that completely
eliminating the income thresholds and taxing eighty-five percent
of benefits would raise $112.5 billion over five years. Finally,
Table 2 shows that retaining the $25,000 and $32,000 income
thresholds and taxing eighty-five percent of benefits would raise
$31.5 billion over five years.
President Clinton's original 1993 deficit reduction proposal
approximated the last alternative-taxing eighty-five percent
159. See supra Table 1 and text accompanying note 146.
160. See Jonathan B. Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement
Program: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAX LAW. 915,
965-66 (1992) (citing early proposals to tax a greater portion of Social Security
benefits); see also David Pattison & David E. Harrington, Proposals to Modify the
Taxation of Social Security Benefits: Options and Distributional Effects, SOC. SECURITY
BULL., Summer 1993, at 3 (discussing numerous proposals to tax Social Security
Benefits).
One of the most common suggestions has been to tax Social Security benefits exactly
like private pensions and annuities. Myers, supra note 109, at 1545. For example,
an individual receiving benefits under a private pension plan usually excludes just
a small fraction of those benefits from income. That fraction, known as the exclusion
ratio, is based on the amount of after-tax contributions the individual made as an
employee. The exclusion ratio enables the employee to recover his own after-tax
contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the remaining portion of pension benefits
which represents income. Id. See I.R.C. § 72 (1988) (discussing the tax treatment
of annuities).
161. See supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text.
162. 1993 CBO OPTIONS, supra note 144, at 358-59. This reform came to fruition
as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,215,
107 Stat. 312, 475-77 (codified at I.R.C. § 86 (1988)). See supra notes 107-108 and
accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
ANNUAL ADDED REVENUES FROM TAXING A GREATER
PORTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
A. RETAIN THE CURRENT INCOME THRESHOLDS
Annual Added Revenues
(Billions of Dollars)
Addition to 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 5-Year
CBO Baseline Sum
Increase the
Fraction of
Benefits 2.8 6.0 6.8 7.5 8.3 31.5
Included in
Adjusted
Gross Income
to Tax up to
85% of
Benefits
B. ELIMINATE THE INCOME THRESHOLDS
Annual Added Revenues
(Billions of Dollars)
Addition
to CBO 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 5-Year
Baseline Sum
Tax 50%
Percent 3.9 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.0 43.6
of
Benefits
Tax 85%
Percent 10.06 24.1 25.0 25.9 26.9 112.5
of
Benefits
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Options for Deficit Reduction (1993)
SUMMER 1993] 807
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:4
of benefits over the $25,000 and $32,000 thresholds.'63 As
enacted, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993'64 adds
a second tier of taxation: starting in 1994, single taxpayers with
incomes over $34,000 and married couples with incomes over
$44,000 will have to pay income taxes on as much as eighty-five
percent of their Social Security benefits.'65 The provision will
raise roughly $25 billion over five years.'66
2. Taxation of the Insurance Value of Medicare
Benefits-The exclusion of Medicare benefits also has been
identified routinely as a tax expenditure.16 ' The federal govern-
ment first began seriously to consider taxing Medicare benefits
when it was looking for ways to finance the Catastrophic Health
Insurance Act.' 68  The Bush Administration also considered
taxing Medicare benefits.1 69 Neither effort came to fruition.
Most recently, as one of its proposals for deficit reduction, the
CBO also suggested taxing a larger portion of Medicare
benefits.7
There are a number of reasons to consider taxing Medicare
benefits. The costs of the Medicare program have skyrocketed
in recent years,' 7 ' and the contributions made by current
beneficiaries will cover only a small portion of the costs of their
expected lifetime benefits.'72 Moreover, as Medicare is not
163. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, A VION OF CHANGE FOR AMERICA, RH.
DOC. No. 49, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1993) (summarizing and analyzing the Clinton
Administration's Economic Plan). President Clinton's proposal differed in one minor
respect, because President Clinton promised that his proposal would not tax any more
Social Security beneficiaries. This made the Clinton proposal somewhat more
complicated and somewhat less lucrative than the Congressional Budget Office's third
alternative. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 106-08 (1993).
164. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
165. § 13,215, 107 Stat. at 475-77 (codified at I.R.C. § 86 (1988)).
166. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 1sT SESS., ESTIMATED BuDGET
EFFECTS OF H.R. 2264 AS AGREED TO BY THE CONFEREES 2 (Comm. Print 1993).
167. See supra notes 140-144.
168. See Finance Committee Reviews Catastrophic Health Care Financing Options,
87 TAx NOTES TODAY 59-2, Mar. 27, 1987.
169. See David Wessel, Bush Budget Chief Studies Ways to Raise Added Billions,
Including Medicare Tax, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1989, at A2.
170. 1993 CBO OPTIONS, supra note 144, at 365-66.
171. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 142 (indicating that total Medicare
benefit payments have more than doubled from 1985 to 1992).
172. See Sandra Christensen, The Subsidy Provided Under Medicare to Current
Enrollees, 17 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 255, 255 (1992); Robert J. Myers & Bruce D.
Schobel, An Updated Money's Worth Analysis of Social Security Retirement Benefits,
44 TRANSACTIONS 47, 68-69 (1993); see also 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1293-1306
(comparing contributions to benefits received).
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means-tested, many Medicare beneficiaries are relatively well-
off.173 In effect, Medicare payroll taxes collected from low-
income working taxpayers are being used to finance health care
benefits for well-off retirees. According to one recent study, the
annual value of the subsidy to current beneficiaries was at least
$2100 per year, per person in dollars discounted to 1991.171
Thus, taxing the insurance value of Medicare benefits would
have a leveling effect on this wealth disparity.
The broadest CBO proposal would tax up to half of the
insurance value of Medicare Part A hospital insurance benefits
and up to seventy-five percent of the insurance value of
Medicare Part B supplementary medical insurance benefits.
175
Table 3 demonstrates that this proposal would raise almost $55
billion over five years. The Congressional Budget Office also
considered using the income thresholds of $25,000 for singles
and $32,000 for couples to limit the application of the tax on
Medicare benefits. This proposal would raise almost $31 billion
over five years. In either case, the additional tax liability for
taxpayers in or above the twenty-eight percent tax bracket could
be substantial-as much as $817 in 1994 for single individuals
and $1635 for couples. 76
Under current law, many employees are able to exclude the
value of health insurance coverage for themselves and their
families as well as the amount of any health insurance
reimbursements for medical care they receive. 177 Some might
believe that it would be inequitable to tax the insurance value
of Medicare benefits while retaining the exclusion for employer-
provided insurance benefits. On the other hand, Medicare
beneficiaries currently are not earning their coverage. Medicare
benefits are best understood as coming only in part from the
173. Poverty is a much greater problems among children than it is among the
elderly. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1307-09 (discussing poverty rates by
age and family type). Moreover, the elderly have greater wealth than younger
taxpayers. See id. at 1559-60 (listing median net worth of householders by age).
174. Christensen, supra note 172, at 255.
175. See 1993 CBO OPTIONS, supra note 144, at 365. Eligibility for Medicare Part
A is based upon payroll tax contributions, half of which are paid by employees from
after-tax income and half of which are paid by employers from pretax income; hence,
taxing 50% of the insurance value of Hospital Insurance would reflect the portion of
contributions that was not taxed originally. With respect to Medicare Part B,
participant premiums currently cover about 25% of the insurance value; hence, the
remaining 75% of the insurance value could be added to participants' taxable income.
176. 1993 CBO OPTIONS, supra note 144, at 366.
177. See I.R.C. §§ 104-106 (1988).
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TABLE 3
ANNUAL ADDED REVENUES FROM TAXING A PORTION OF
MEDICARE BENEFITS
A. WITHOUT INCOME THRESHOLD
Annual Added Revenues
(Billions of Dollars)
Addition to 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 5-Year
CBO Baseline 1 1997 
199 ___ Sum
Hospital
Insurance Only 1.3 4.5 5.0 5.6 6.2 22.6
Supplementary
Medical 1.5 5.3 6.1 7.2 8.5 28.6
Insurance Only
Both 3.0 10.5 11.9 13.6 i5.6 54.6
B. WITH INCOME THRESHOLD
Annual Added Revenues
(Billions of Dollars)
Addition to 1994 1 1995 1996 1 1997 1998 5-Year
CBO Baseline Sum
Hospital
Insurance Only 0.9 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.8 13.3
Supplementary
Medical
Insurance Only 1.0 2.8 3.5 4.2 5.1 16.7
Both 2.0 5.3 6.4 7.7 9.1 30.6
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Options for Deficit Reduction (1993)
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Medicare taxes paid by beneficiaries while they were working
and in much larger part by transfers from the taxes paid by
taxpayers currently in the work force. v8
3. Taxation of the Income-Replacement Portion of Workers'
Compensation Benefits-The exclusion of workers' compensation
benefits also has been identified routinely as a tax expendi-
ture, 179 and numerous tax analysts have recommended taxing
the portion of workers' compensation benefits that replaces the
injured employee's lost income. 180 In 1977, the U.S. Department
of Treasury noted that a model income tax would include
workers' compensation benefits as income. 18 1 In 1984, the U.S.
Department of Treasury again recommended taxing the income
replacement portion of worker's compensation,8 2 and in 1985
President Reagan formally made that recommendation to
Congress,8 3 but such a provision was not enacted. In 1993, as
yet another of its options for deficit reduction, the Congressional
Budget Office suggested taxing the income replacement portion
of workers' compensation benefits. The Congressional Budget
Office estimates that this proposal would raise $20.2 billion over
five years.8 4
Taxing workers' compensation benefits would make their tax
treatment more comparable to the treatment of unemployment
benefits and employer-provided sick pay and disability pensions.
It might not be fair, however, to tax workers' compensation
benefits unless the exclusion for damages received on account
of non-work-related injuries or sickness also was repealed. 8 5
Taxing workers' compensation benefits also would give disabled
workers a greater incentive to return to work. 8 ' The tax might
force some legislatures, however, to find the resources to
increase benefit levels to offset the increased taxes paid on
benefits.
4. Taxation of Public Assistance Benefits-The exclusion
of public assistance benefits also has been identified routinely
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 140-144.
180. One such proposal is found in Dodyk, supra note 132, at 794-800. For similar
proposals see sources cited supra note 132.
181. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 117, at 59.
182. See 1984 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 120, at 51-57.
183. See REAGAN TAX PROPOSAL, supra note 121, at 49-56.
184. 1993 CBO OPTIONS, supra note 144, at 357. That portion of workers'
compensation and Black Lung benefits which reimburses employees for medical costs
(about 40%) would continue to be exempt from taxation. Id.
185. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988). I would support such a change.
186. Work disincentives arise any time the value of tax-free benefits approach the
after-tax value of the wages that an individual can earn. See Feldstein, supra note
117, at 241-43.
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as a tax expenditure, 187 and several tax analysts have argued
for inclusion of means-tested benefits in income.188 In 1977, the
U.S. Department of Treasury noted that a model income tax
would include in income all cash transfer payments from the
government, whether means-tested or not.189 Thus far, however,
there has not been a serious public proposal to tax means-tested
public assistance benefits. 19°
The basic argument for taxing public assistance benefits is
one of equity: people with the same income should be taxed
equally. 191 The failure to tax public assistance benefits is
thought to favor unfairly recipients of this type of income over
other individuals who earn less and whose income is further
diminished by taxes. Proponents argue that the program should
tax public assistance benefits and use those tax revenues to
increase benefits for the most needy.'92
Standard deductions and personal exemptions already ensure
that almost no low-income taxpayers actually pay any income
tax. A taxpayer's standard deduction and personal exemptions
combine to establish a simple income tax threshold; a taxpayer
owes no income tax unless the taxpayer's income exceeds the
applicable income tax threshold.' 93 Table 4 compares the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' so-called poverty
income guidelines'94 with these simple income tax thresholds
for family units of up to eight persons.
187. See supra notes 140-144.
188. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 132.
189. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 117, at 61.
190. The Bush administration considered taxing food stamps and welfare benefits,
but nothing resulted from it. See Wessel, supra note 169, at A2. The Republican
administration apparently did not want to be accused of "taxing the poor." It should
be noted that the Clinton Administration currently is considering a proposal to tax
welfare benefits. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, supra note 132, at
12-14.
192. See, e.g., Dodyk, supra note 132, at 794-800.
193. For example, in 1993, a family of four consisting of a husband and wife filing
ajoint tax return with two dependents would be entitled to a $6200 standard deduction
and four $2350 personal exemptions. See Rev. Proc. 92-102, 1992-2 C.B. 579, 579-80.
Consequently, the family would not have to pay any income tax until its income
exceeded $15,600.
194. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Annual Update
of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 8287 (1993) [hereinafter Poverty
Guidelines].
The poverty income guidelines are a simplified version of the federal government's
statistical poverty thresholds used by the Census Bureau to prepare statistical
estimates of the number of persons and families in poverty. Each year, the Department
of Health and Human Services updates its poverty income guidelines to reflect the
prior year's change in the Consumer Price Index. These poverty income guidelines
are used as eligibility criteria by a number of social welfare programs. See id. at 8288.
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TABLE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POVERTY INCOME GUIDELINE AND
SIMPLE INcoME TAx THRESHOLDS, 1993
Size and Type of Applicable Simple
Family Unit Poverty Income Tax
Income Threshold
Guideline
1 $6970 $6050
1 (over 65 or blind) $6970 $6950
2 (head of household and 1 child) $9430 $10,150
2 (couple) $9430 $10,900
3 (head of household and 2 children) $11,890 $12,500
3 (couple and child) $11,890 $13,250
4 (couple and 2 children) $14,350 $15,600
5 (couple and 3 children) $16,810 $17,950
6 (couple and 4 children) $19,270 $20,300
7 (couple and 5 children) $21,730 $22,650
8 (couple and 6 children) $24,190 $25,000
Table 4 shows that for family units larger than one, the
simple income tax threshold exceeded the applicable poverty
income guideline in 1993; that is, all families with incomes
below the applicable poverty income guideline were not subject
to federal income taxation.'95 Even single individuals did not
owe any income tax unless the individual's taxable income
exceeded $6050, $920 below the applicable poverty line.
Thus, because standard deductions and personal exemptions
already protect low-income taxpayers from virtually any income
tax liability, the current exclusion of public assistance benefits
does almost nothing more tohelp them. Instead, virtually all
of the tax savings from the exclusion of public assistance
benefits inure to taxpayers who are decidedly not low-income.
Put simply, the exclusion of public assistance benefits does not
195. These simple income tax thresholds ignore the impact of the earned income
credit. Factoring in the earned income credit for those taxpayers who qualify for the
credit would result in even higher thresholds. For example, in 1992, a married couple
with two dependent children had a simple income tax threshold of $15,200 ($6000
standard deduction plus four $2300 personal exemptions). When the impact of the
earned income credit was taken into account, however, that family had no income tax
liability until its income reached $18,548. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1477.
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help the most needy individuals and greater equity could be
achieved by taxing the public assistance benefits received by
higher-income taxpayers and redistributing those revenues to
lower-income taxpayers.'
96
On the other hand, public assistance benefits already are
targeted to the most needy through means testing by way of
benefit-reduction formulae. If public assistance benefits were
subject to income taxation, the combination of income taxes,
Social Security taxes, and benefit-reduction rates would result
in an extraordinarily high cumulative marginal tax rate for
some individuals. 197 Such high marginal tax rates can and
assuredly do discourage people from working and offer the most
compelling reason not to tax public assistance benefits, or at
least to figure out how to better synchronize the tax and welfare
systems. 
98
The failure to tax public assistance benefits, however, itself
results in disincentives to work. As previously noted,' 99 work
disincentives arise any time the value of tax-free benefits
approach the after-tax value of the wages that an individual
can earn.20 0 For example, many recipients of AFDC and food
stamps actually fare worse economically if they work at low-
wage jobs than if they remain on welfare. After paying income
and Social Security taxes, some low-wage workers will have less
after-tax income than welfare will provide, and leaving welfare
results in the termination of valuable Medicaid benefits for the
worker and the worker's family. Consequently, taxing AFDC
and Medicaid benefits might help to avoid such work
disincentives.
196. This point is even more compelling with respect to such non-means-tested
benefits as Social Security and Medicare. Standard deductions and personal exemptions
would protect all low-income Social Security beneficiaries from income tax liability
on their benefits. For example, in 1993, an elderly couple will not have to pay any
income tax unless the couple's taxable income exceeds $12,300 (the sum of a $6200
basic standard deduction, two $700 additional standard deductions for the elderly,
and two $2350 personal exemptions). Thus, if Congress were to eliminate the income
floors and tax 85% of Social Security benefits, an elderly couple whose only source of
income was Social Security benefits would not pay any income tax until the couple
received more than $14,470 in Social Security benefits ($14,470 x 85% = $12,300).
In comparison, the Department of Health and Human Services' 1993 poverty income
guideline for a family of two isjust $9430. Poverty Guidelines, supra note 194, at 8288.
197. See, Jonathan B. Forman, Does Bill Clinton Really Mean to Subject Elderly
Workers to Confiscatory Tax Rates?, 59 TAx NOTES 119, 120 (1993) (finding cumulative
marginal tax rates as high as 100% for certain elderly workers).
198. See Forman, Administrative Savings, supra note 1, at 4-8 (noting that
synchronization may solve the problem of high marginal tax rates).
199. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
200. See Feldstein, supra note 117, at 241-43.
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Moreover, the low participation rates associated with most
forms of public assistance raise another important equity
question. Only about sixty percent of the poor participate in
the food stamp program;201 only about sixty percent of poor
children are covered by AFDC;20 2 and only about sixty percent
of the elderly poor participate in SSI.2 ' Thus, the failure to
tax public assistance tends to increase the differences between
the disposable incomes of welfare program participants and
nonparticipants who struggle in low-paying jobs to earn a living.
Consequently, taxing public assistance benefits would temper
that inequity.
Unfortunately, taxing public assistance benefits would
increase the complexity of the tax laws.2 °4 In addition, taxing
in-kind benefits such as Medicaid, food stamps, and housing
assistance would require valuation and thus could create
administrative difficulties. There has been a good deal of
research on valuation of social welfare benefits, and the
problems of valuation may not be insurmountable.0 5 One
solution would be to replace most in-kind benefits with
equivalent cash benefits. 20 6 Alternatively, in-kind benefits like
food stamps could simply be valued according to their face
amounts.207
CONCLUSION
The federal government's huge public debt and its annual
deficits invariably will push it to consider income taxation of
social welfare benefits as a means of raising needed revenues.
201. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 1621.
202. Id. at 688.
203. Id. at 845.
204. See Sunley, supra note 117, at 104. Presumably, social welfare agencies would
have to withhold taxes from benefit awards and comply with a variety of IRS
information reporting requirements.
205. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONCASH BENEFrTS: INITIAL RESULTS SHOW
VALUAION METHODS DIFFEN'IIAILY AFLT THE POOR (198 US. GENERAL AOcOuWNmG OFFICE,
NONCASH BENEFrIs: METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL METHODs INDICATES MANY
PROBLEMS REMAIN (1987); Robert Moffitt, Estimating the Value of an In-Kind Transfer:
The Case of Food Stamps, 57 ECONOMETRICA 385 (1989).
206. See Jonathan B. Forman, Time to Cash Out Food Stamps, LEGAL TIMES, Feb.
22, 1993, at 36-37.
207. Notably, this alternative would help discourage the resale and misuse of food
stamps.
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Efforts to reform the health and welfare systems also should
cause the federal government to reconsider how the tax system
treats social welfare benefits. Workers' compensation and
Medicare benefits are the most likely targets for income
taxation, but even such public assistance programs as AFDC,
Medicaid, and food stamps may soon come under the Congres-
sional revenue-raisers' scrutiny.
